No. Middle East No 65

CO 935/23

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NAME Future policy in Aden Protectorate

(not printed - some proofs only)

Previous				
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(9207) Wt. 31967/8590 200 9/64 P.I. Gp. 610

Mr. Croghan,

Colonial Office Confidential Departmental Prints

Middle East No. 65

The above print has been under review and following an exchange of minutes between Mr. Formoy and Mr. Cheeseman it was decided that there was now no Departmental requirement for the print. H.M.S.O. Press at Harrow has been asked to disperse the type-set.

Only four items were set up in type and I am forwarding them to you in case you wish to have them for record purposes. You will wish to amend the Register of Departmental Prints held in the Library.

F. J. Oldham
5.02.
22/6/64.

CO 935/23

78481/42 [No. 4]. No.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

to

THE GOVERNOR.

(Confidential.)

[*Answered by No.* .]

SIR, Colonial Office, 3rd September, 1942.

I have the honour to acknowledge your confidential despatch of the 8th of May, 1942*, in which you submitted your comments on the draft Memorandum on future policy and development in the Aden Protectorate.

2. The corrections which you proposed in paragraph 3 of your despatch have now been embodied in the Memorandum. I accept your views on the original paragraph 19 of the draft Memorandum, and a revised paragraph—now paragraph 17—has been drafted incorporating the substance of your comments.

3. As regards the purpose of the Memorandum, I share your opinion that a rigid condification of the policy of His Majesty's Government in respect of the Aden Protectorate is to be avoided; and, provided that the main principles which have been adopted are appreciated and preserved, I agree that an informative and reliable guide to the evolution of policy and practice can well be obtained from the opinions and statements of those entrusted with the conduct of affairs in the Protectorate, which have received the approval of His Majesty's Government. I concur in regarding the two despatches to which you refer as suitable examples of such statements, and I would add to them your own confidential despatch of 12th September, 1941†.

4. At the same time I consider that the Memorandum as now revised (with copies of the three despatches appended thereto) is not without value as a review in broad outline of the policy of His Majesty's Government in the Protectorate. I enclose a copy‡ for your general information and guidance in present circumstances, but it is not intended to set out in a formal or final manner the aims and intentions of His Majesty's Government regarding the Protectorate. On the contrary, it is fully realised that future experience and changing circumstances may well lead to modifications in the views embodied in the Memorandum.

I have, etc.,

ØRANBORNE.

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* 78481/42 [No. 1]. † 78575 [No. 4]. ‡ Enclosure in No. 78481/40 [No. 10].

Aden

—(C.49540/469). 6.

Working Copy.

78481/40 [No. 10]. No. TRODE.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

to

THE GOVERNOR.

[*Answered by No.* .]

1942

(Confidential.)

SIR, Downing Street, 2nd January, 1941.

I have the honour to refer to my predecessor's confidential despatch dated 8th May, 1940,* in which I stated that a memorandum was being prepared to review the lines of future policy and development in the Aden Protectorate. A draft memorandum has now been completed, and I enclose a copy for your consideration.

I shall be glad to receive your advice and comments upon it in due course for my further consideration.

I have, etc.,

LLOYD.

Enclosure in No. .

MEMORANDUM ON POLICY IN THE ADEN PROTECTORATE.

Treaty Position.

(Confidential.)

The Treaty engagements entered into with the Chiefs of the Aden hinterland are generally of three types. The first contains a provision extending the gracious favour and protection of His Majesty to the territory of the Ruler and an undertaking by the Ruler to refrain from correspondence or treaty relations with any foreign power and from ceding, leasing or mortgaging territory to a foreign power. The second type is a treaty of peace and friendship and provides for the protection of the trade routes in return for a stipend in addition to the provisions included in the first type. The third type is merely an engagement for the protection of trade routes in return for a stipend. Treaties or engagements on these lines have been entered into with some thirty different chiefs. In addition, treaties have been signed with the Sultan of Mukalla and the Kathiri Sultan on 13th August, 1937, and 2nd March, 1939, under which the two Sultans agree to accept a British Resident Adviser and to accept his advice in all matters save those relating to Muhammadan religion and custom. Finally, in 1939, an agreement was signed between His Majesty's Government, the Sultan of Mukalla, and the Kathiri Sultan reconstituting the Qu'aiti-Kathiri Agreement of 1918.

The policy in force has always been that His Majesty's Government will assist the Sultans and chiefs in the good government of their States, but that there would be no direct administration of any part of the Protectorate by His Majesty's Government. In other words His Majesty's Government will help in the maintenance and development of the local Arab Governments. So firmly established is this principle that it was embodied in the terms of the Anglo-Italian agreement of 1938, and it remains the basis of our policy in the Protectorate.

Political Control and Administrative Measures.

2. This clearly defined principle has, however, not prevented us from establishing in recent years much greater contact with the Protectorate generally and from making serious efforts to secure better conditions than those which have obtained in past generations. There are now in the Protectorate between 15 and 20 British officials, mostly Political Officers. For the most part, however, these officials are not in the service of the local Sultans or Chiefs. Their duties are advisory only. No revenue is collected in the Protectorate by His Majesty's Government.

All expenditure, therefore, required for the salaries and activities of the British officials has to be found by His Majesty's Government. In certain of the States of the Protectorate there is in existence an Arab Government which collects revenue and administers certain State services. Such States are the Sultanates of Mukalla and Lahej. It is hoped soon that this will also be the position of the Kathiri and possibly of the Balhaf State. With these four exceptions, however, there is no ordered government in the Protectorate in the sense in which we understand the term. The remaining area consists for the most part of small tribal areas under the overlordship of local Chieftains, and there are certain areas where not even this amount of rule operates.

On the other hand, there are certain other areas where as a result of recent contact by Political Officers considerable advance has been made in the establishment of better conditions. Instances of this are the Abyan and the Subeihi areas and the Audhali plateau. In those parts of the Protectorate only a few years ago there existed a state of anarchy and strife among the tribesmen which prevented the existence of any ordered life. Fields were left uncultivated; it was unsafe to travel, and the inhabitants were victims of hunger, disease, and apathy. In these areas encouraging improvement has been made in the social and agricultural life of the people. An outstanding instance of agricultural progress is to be found in the Abyan and Khaufar areas, where some thousands of acres of excellent land have been brought under cultivation since the solution of the Nafia water dispute. In the Eastern Aden Protectorate conditions are in some parts as anarchic as in the Western Protectorate, but in the Sultanate of Mukalla and the Kathiri Sultanate more advanced conditions of life exist, and as a result of the recent appointment of a British Resident Adviser to the Sultans a complete reorganisation of the machinery of government has been achieved, or is in process of being achieved, in these States, somewhat on the lines of the less developed Unfederated States in Malaya.

3. There has been a suggestion that in the future the Hadhramaut States might be combined in some form of federation without losing their own ostensible "sovereignty." Experience in the Malay States, although on a larger scale, should form some guide as to policy in this respect. It has recently been decided to form a postal union of Aden and the Qu'aiti and Kathiri States; and these two States are to have their own issue of stamps. It was decided that, if the Sultan of Lahej and the Amir of Dhala also wished to have their own issue of stamps, they should be permitted to do so, but so far no request of this sort has been made. It is perhaps early days for them to raise the

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* 78481/40 [No. 5]: not printed.

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(C.49540/466). 6

? reference

matter as stamps have not yet been brought into use by the Hadhramaut States. The Qu'aiti and Kathiri States also issue their own passports, and it has been decided that the Sultan of Lahej must also be allowed the same privilege if he asks for it. It has also been proposed that there should be formed as soon as possible a customs union in the Hadhramaut States. This will be a more difficult achievement since in the smaller States the present control over customs is extremely inadequate and there is jealousy among the local Chiefs as to their respective shares of the customs duties. Some form of union may, however, eventually be found possible and would no doubt increase revenue and give benefit if it can be arranged.

4. His Majesty's Government as the Protecting Power, is entitled to demand that Chiefs and Tribes should conform to certain standards laid down by the British Government, such as the preservation of internal tranquility and the maintenance of security on the trade routes, and should, when necessary, accept advice and assistance from British Political Officers. The conditions and needs of the various Tribal areas require individual study. In some parts the Advisory system is appropriate and welcome, in others any attempt to impose it would still be regarded with suspicion and would be strongly resented. In the latter cases the British authorities must be circumspect and tread warily. Their object throughout the Protectorate must be to gain the confidence and goodwill of the people, and to work in co-operation with them, and not to force the pace prematurely. This self-restraint must often be irksome to officers who see gross abuses that they long to remedy, and they will frequently be confronted with the problem of how far to interfere with Chiefs who are obviously oppressing large sections of the population. It must be remembered that such Chiefs will often have the support of their "tribesmen" (or of some of them) in distinction to the "subjects."* The "subjects," as distinct from the tribesmen would probably in many cases welcome direct British (or any other foreign) rule that would protect them from the unconscionable impositions of their Chiefs, and in such cases care must be taken in steering a middle course that will avoid direct administration and yet give relief to the people, without which agricultural or other reforms cannot prosper. The degree of coercion that can properly be applied to a bad Chief will often be difficult to decide. If he can be persuaded to accept an Advisory treaty the problem should—at any rate in theory—be solved, but an Advisory system may easily lead to direct British rule very thinly disguised; and it must be remembered that we not only disclaim any intention of establishing direct rule, but also quite sincerely and genuinely do not wish to do so. We must therefore preserve the authority of the Chiefs, and limit ourselves to requiring from them certain standards in their exercise of it. To achieve this purpose we may at times have to go to considerable lengths of interference, but such intervention should be temporary, and we should keep steadily in front of us the aim of establishing in the Aden Protectorate a group of efficient local Arab authorities who will conduct their own administration under the general supervision, guidance and protection of His Majesty's Government.

5. With this policy in view we should clearly accept as a basic principle that His Majesty's Government will impose no direct taxation in the Protectorate. All taxation should be imposed and collected by or in the name of the local Arab authorities, although they may have to exercise this function of government in conformity with British advice. Even in cases in which His Majesty's Government may contribute largely to the financing of improvements, such as road or agricultural development, any special tolls or dues levied in connection with such schemes should pass into local funds in conformity with British advice, and no part of them be paid into the United Kingdom exchequer. His Majesty's Government will benefit indirectly through the increased prosperity of the Protectorate, which should react to the advantage of the British Colony of Aden and British prestige in Southern Arabia; but the maintenance of this fiscal principle will emphasise the policy of indirect rule in the Protectorate, and the determination of the British Government to preserve the Arab character of the Protectorate and to avoid any form of annexation.

6. It is important that this financial policy should be maintained in spite of retrenchments in Protectorate expenditure that may become necessary in times of national emergency. This may prove to be a difficult problem and the likelihood that it will have to be faced must be borne in mind in shaping projects of civil development.

7. In the military sphere, on the basis that His Majesty's Government must continue to accept the responsibility of defending the Protectorate against external aggression, the maintenance of internal peace and security should be the duty of local Arab forces acting under the guidance of the Protecting Power. This is an ideal that cannot be attained at once, and it will be necessary for some time to come to maintain order inside the Protectorate partly through the Protectorate Government forces such as the Government Guards, and when the necessity arises, through the Royal Air Force. But the nucleus of local internal security forces already exists in the Lahej Trained Forces, the Mukalla Regular Army, the Kathiri Constabulary, and various units of Tribal Guards. Much work is still needed for the improvement of these forces, and the establishment of similar local units in other tribal areas; in carrying out this work British guidance, encouragement, and help will be necessary, but eventually the Arab local forces should be able to keep internal order themselves and the need for direct British intervention should progressively diminish.

8. We have, in fact, to reconcile our presence in the Aden Protectorate ~~without~~ with our very real sympathy with Arab independence. Direct British rule in the Colony of Aden is long established and cannot be abolished without undoing most of our work there. It is moreover willingly accepted

* Tribesmen (qabail) have the status of full partnership in a tribe. The Chief, although usually a close relative of his predecessor, is elected by them and is one of them; he is *primus inter pares*, and can make no important decision without their general consent, and they are not bound to obey him. Subjects (raya) have no voice in the Chief's election, or in the control of tribal affairs. They are subject to orders and taxation by the Chief. Conditions vary in different tribes. In Upper Yafa all are tribesmen, and therefore, as they themselves say, need obey no one.

by the Arab inhabitants of the Colony, who certainly do not desire its disappearance. It should, however, be limited to the small area of the Colony; and the preservation of the Protectorate as a separate entity in which a different policy prevails should be continued. This does not imply that the Colony and the Protectorate have not many interests in common, which can be dealt with by joint action, or that there should not be interchangeability of official personnel between the Colony and the Protectorate, but our aims in the two must remain distinct. In Aden we have to continue the development of a British possession that is predominantly Arab, but it has also an imperial and an international importance in the sense that it is a vital imperial naval and military base and that its prosperity rests on sea-borne international trade which brings to it a mixed domiciled community. The Protectorate, on the other hand, is wholly Arab, and should be developed on Arab lines, under British protection and with British help, to become a group of Arab units co-operating in as close a union as possible, and an example of what can be achieved by Anglo-Arab collaboration and friendship.

9. The division of the Protectorate into Western and Eastern areas is due to reasons that are partly geographical and partly inherent in the different characteristics of the two regions. The Division is unavoidable, and it is as well to recognise it, although not emphasise it too strongly. Geographically, Aden lies at the south-western corner of the Protectorate and not near its centre. The consequence is that the Eastern Protectorate is in many ways remote from Aden, and does not look to it as its natural metropolis. The people of Hadhramaut, with their links in India, Malaya, and Java, look to Hyderabad, Singapore, and Batavia rather than to Aden. Their wealth and their recent development are due to their contacts with those places, and they owe little or nothing to Aden. They are culturally more advanced and more modern than the backward, conservative people of the Western Protectorate, and they require separate treatment by the Protecting Power. But, although methods and reforms for which the Eastern Protectorate is ready may still be unpalatable in the Western, it would be a mistake to lay too much stress on these divergencies. Every tribe in the Protectorate differs in some ways from its neighbours, but fundamentally they are the same people, and this is true also of the Eastern and Western portions of the Protectorate, save for obvious differences in the Hadhramaut due to a mixture of Far Eastern blood in certain classes of the inhabitants. Our aims in both portions are the same, though our methods of working for them may have to differ. In the Western Protectorate we have to deal with strong prejudices and suspicions that in the Eastern have been softened by greater contact with the outer world. We also have to deal with poorer communities, none of whose members have the imported wealth possessed by some families and people in the Hadhramaut States. It follows that, although it is possible to lay down a general policy of indirect rule for the Protectorate as a whole, the application of this policy must vary considerably in its different parts, and the problem demands careful study by those who work in the Protectorate and have experience and knowledge of its people and their varying characteristics.

10. Aden itself, as distinct from the Protectorate, is and must remain a British Colony directly administered by British officials. All Colony officers should, however, normally be appointed with a liability for service in, or work connected with, the Protectorate as required by the Governor.

11. If and when a Legislative Council is established in the Colony of Aden it will have no functions in the Protectorate.

12. The Officer Administering the Government of the Colony is also Governor of the Protectorate. In the Protectorate the Governor is called Wali (Governor) by the inhabitants. The "indirect rule" policy would justify the Governor being termed High Commissioner (as in the Malay States) in respect of the Protectorate. He would, however, no doubt continue to be called Wali by the Arabs. Although the title of High Commissioner might emphasise the distinction between direct administration in the Colony and indirect rule in the Protectorate, nevertheless the change of title might give rise to suspicions as to the motive behind it, and it is probably preferable to retain the title of Governor for both Colony and Protectorate, as in Burma, where the Governor has no alternative title in respect of the Shan States.

13. The Chief Secretary is the Governor's Principal Adviser on all Protectorate affairs, and the British Agents in charge of the Eastern Aden Protectorate and the Western Aden Protectorate communicate with him, and not directly with the Governor. Political Officers communicate first of all with the British Agents in charge of the Western and Eastern Protectorates.

14. British Agents were appointed in both Protectorates on 1st April, 1942. The British Agent for the Eastern Protectorate is also Resident Adviser at Mukalla, whose powers are exercised in conformity with the instructions of the Governor transmitted to him through the Chief Secretary. If the Sultan of Lahej were in the future to ask for the appointment of a Resident Adviser in his State, the Government Agent in the Western Protectorate would be the obvious representative of the Protectorate Government to assume those functions. The present Sultan of Lahej is not, however, likely to ask for a Resident Adviser, and our relations with him are quite satisfactory under existing arrangements.

15. The development of practical co-operation between the Chiefs and Tribes of the Protectorate should be our aim, but there can be no question of *coercing* independent rulers to merge themselves into union. Collective patriotism for an Aden Protectorate loyal to the British Crown should be promoted, and Customs agreements leading to the abolition of barriers, and road agreements facilitating intercourse between the various parts of the country, and between them and Aden, should be encouraged as leading towards the achievement of this object.

16. Sir Stewart Symes, when Resident at Aden in 1929, referred to the method of government by "Jirga" or tribal Councils in Baluchistan, where local conditions were not dissimilar; and he conceived the possibility of eventually constituting in the Aden Protectorate "one or more Chiefs' Councils to be the central authority for the settlement by arbitration and otherwise of tribal affairs, and to become the principal—and native—instrument of our political direction."

17. In pursuance of this policy a Chiefs' Council was convened at Lahej in April, 1929, and on three subsequent occasions, but it was found that it did not achieve results commensurate with its elaborate and expensive façade. There was on every occasion difficulty in formulating agenda likely to attract the members towards any object of common interest, and it seemed that the extreme individualism and mutual suspicion of the Chiefs, combined with the absence of any national incentive and their lack of real authority over their subsidiary clans and tribesmen, showed them to be still in too primitive a social and political state to bear the application of a centripetal force that was not their own choice. The experiment proved itself to be premature, and no attempt has been made to pursue it after the four occasions that have been mentioned. In its place, as a more elementary step in tribal administration, a Protectorate Affairs Council has been constituted under the Presidency of the Governor, with the Sultan of Lahej as Vice-President and with the British Agents, Eastern Aden Protectorate and Western Aden Protectorate, the Chief Secretary, and the Political Officer and Commandant, Government Guards, as members. By this means, and by constant consultation, it has been possible to secure the advice of the Sultan of Lahej, whose position as *primus inter pares* among the Western Protectorate Chiefs is preserved without the embarrassment to him of his more striking advertisement as such while in the position of host and president of a congress at Lahej. The wishes of the Chiefs are adequately ventilated through the political staff and the Sultan of Lahej, and it is proposed to postpone any attempt to bring them together in regular and formal council until the existing political organisation has further developed and its benefits have ripened, or until there are clear signs of a wish by the Chiefs themselves for mutual consultation in congress.

Local Forces.

18. The Aden Protectorate Levies are recruited from the Protectorate and mainly from the tribes in the eastern part of the Western Protectorate, which provide the best military material. The Levies are a military unit under the control of the Air Officer Commanding. Besides them there are in the Protectorate the following local forces which exist for internal security and are under civil control:—The Government Guards; the Tribal Guards in a number of States; local forces in the Qu'aiti and Kathiri States; and the Hadhrami Bedouin Legion. The Government Guards were formed in April, 1938, and their organisation and discipline have made good progress. The Tribal Guards are small bodies of locally enlisted tribesmen whose function is to keep order in their tribal areas; they are responsible to their Chiefs, and the supervision exercised by the Superintendent of the Tribal Guards and by the Political Officer is on the Chiefs' behalf and by way of assistance to them in maintaining the Tribal Guards in some degree of order and elementary discipline. The forces of the Sultan of Mukalla are not yet of great military value, although their organisation has been improved as a result of the efforts made by the British Resident Adviser and his Military Assistant. The Hadhrami Bedouin Legion is in process of formation. The Kathiri State has only a force of armed constabulary based on the Tribal Guards organisation. The Government Guards customarily operate only in the Western Protectorate, and their use in the Eastern Protectorate States might be resented since the Sultan of Mukalla and the Kathiri Sultan consider that their own State forces should be used and not a body brought from elsewhere.

Past and Future Policy.

19. This Memorandum is a review in broad outline of the policy of His Majesty's Government in the Aden Protectorate, but future experience and changing circumstances may lead to modifications of the views which it embodies, and it is not intended to crystalise in any formal manner our aims and intentions in the Protectorate. The development of security and prosperity in this territory must be a gradual process, and reliance must be placed on the continually growing body of informed opinion and practice of those entrusted with the conduct of its affairs, based on the recognised principles of maintenance of our treaty obligations and of the furtherance and development of Arab autonomy. Examples of statements of such opinions and descriptions of such practice are to be found in despatches from successive Residents and Governors of Aden; and copies of the three following despatches are appended to the Memorandum as informative and reliable records of the evolution of policy in the past and as guides to the lines of development in the future:

(1) Sir Stewart Symes's secret despatch No. 14 of 30th January, 1929*;
(2) Sir Bernard Reilly's confidential despatch No. 2 of 14th February, 1940†;
(3) Sir John Hathorn Hall's confidential despatch of 12th September, 1941‡.

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* No. 346 in Middle East No. 22. † No. 78481/40 [No. 1]. ‡ No. 78575/41 [No. 4].

Working Copy.

78481/42 [No. 1]. No. PROOF.

THE GOVERNOR

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 30th May, 1942.)

[*Answered by No.* .]

(*Confidential.*)

(No. S/176.)

MY LORD, Governor's Office, Aden, 8th May, 1942.

I have the honour to refer to Lord Moyne's confidential despatch of the 2nd January, 1941*, and to submit my comments on the Memorandum on future policy and development in the Aden Protectorate that accompanied it.

2. I find nothing in the broad outline of policy set forth in the Memorandum with which I can disagree, nor any aspect of it that conflicts with the more recent note on the same subject by Mr. W. H. Ingrams nor with my comments thereon, submitted to Your Lordship in my confidential despatch of the 12th September, 1941†, with which Your Lordship has expressed general concurrence.

3. The earlier Memorandum is, however, now out of date in certain particulars, and I set out hereunder the places and the manner in which correction is necessary:—

(*a*) *Page 1* (*last line*).—It will be desirable to insert the date of the signing of the " recent " treaties with the Sultan of Mukalla and the Kathiri Sultan, since the Memorandum bears no date. The dates of signature were 13th August, 1937, and 2nd March, 1939.

(*b*) *Page 2* (*fifth line*).—Delete the words " last year ".

(*c*) *Page 4* (*line 2*).—After " Kathiri " insert " and possibly of the Balhaf ".

(*Line 3*).—For " three " read " four ".

(*Last line*).—The word "between " should read " by ".

(*d*) *Page 5* (*second line*).—It will now be appropriate to include also the Audhali Plateau.

(*Third sentence*).—The picture drawn is somewhat too happy. Encouraging improvement has certainly been made in the social and agricultural life of the people, but still only some of the fields are tilled, only some of the inhabitants are better fed, and by no means all the blood feuds have been settled. The outstanding instance of agricultural progress is probably to be found in the Abyan and Khanfar areas where during the last year some thousands of acres of excellent land have been brought newly under cultivation, a process to which the happy solution of the Nazia water dispute is greatly contributing. This is a late development which had not yet been achieved at the time the memorandum was drafted.

(*e*) *Page 6* (*antepenultimate line*).—It will be more correct to say that " stamps have not yet been brought into use by the Hadhramaut States."

(*f*) *Page 10* (*eighth line*).—The words " if possible " are clearly inappropriate.

(*g*) *Page 11* (*penultimate and last lines, et seq.*).—It will be preferable to say, " in spite of retrenchments in Protectorate expenditure that may become necessary in times of national emergency ".

(*h*) *Page 16* (*first sentence*).—Add " Save for obvious differences in the Hadhramaut due to a mixture of Far Eastern blood in certain classes of the inhabitants ".

(*Twelfth line*).—It is incorrect to speak of the imported wealth of the Hadhramaut States; it is only certain families or persons within those States who have such wealth, which is the more notable by contrast with the relative poverty of the States themselves.

(*i*) *Page 17* (*penultimate line*).—The Government Guards were formed in April, 1938, and it will be preferable to say so (*cf.* paragraph (*a*) above).

(*j*) *Page 18* (*first sentence*).—It is necessary to state the fact that the Tribal Guards are responsible to their Chiefs, and that the supervision exercised by the Superintendent of Tribal Guards and by the Political Officer is on the Chiefs' behalf and by way of assistance to them in maintaining the Tribal Guards in some degree of order and elementary discipline.

(*k*) *Page 19*.—Paragraph 12 gives the impression that a Legislative Council exists in the Colony. It should be amended to provide for the future, or preferably deleted.

(*l*) *Page 20* (*eighth and tenth lines*).—The Resident Adviser is now known as " British Agent and Resident Adviser." Political Officers communicate first of all with the British Agents now in charge of the Eastern Aden Protectorate and the Western Aden Protectorate respectively.

(*Paragraph 15*).—" British Agents " were appointed in both Protectorates (that in the Eastern Aden Protectorate being also the Resident Adviser to the Hadhramaut States) on 1st April, 1942. The second part of the paragraph, for the words, " if the Sultan of Lahej . . ." may remain intact.

(*m*) *Page 21*.—Paragraph 16 to be deleted.

(*n*) *Pages 22 and 23* (*paragraph 19*).—I have not been impressed with what I have heard of the results of the experiment initiated by Sir Stewart Symes. The Chiefs' Council was convened on only four occasions, in April, 1929, December, 1930, February, 1932, and April, 1935, and did not, I am advised, achieve results commensurate with its elaborate and (to the Sultan of Lahej) expensive and embarrassing facade. There was on every occasion difficulty in formulating an agenda likely to attract the members towards any object of common interest; and the Chiefs, when they came together, could not detach their minds from selfish considerations, or combine for any joint purpose, or agree either to engage in or to submit to effective arbitration in their differences. It seemed that their extreme individualism and

* No. 78481/40 [No. 10]. † No. 78575/41 [No. 4].

Aden

mutual suspicion, combined with the absence of any national incentive and their lack of real authority over their subsidiary clans and tribesmen, showed them to be still in too primitive a social and political state to bear the application of a centripetal force that was not of their own choice. The experiment proved itself to be premature: indeed, my predecessor seems to have reached a like conclusion, from an opinion recorded in minutes in 1938, that the Conferences as such were of little value. I have not attempted to pursue it; and in its place, by way of a much more elementary step in tribal administration, I have constituted the Protectorate Affairs Council under the presidency of the Governor, with the Sultan of Lahej as Vice-President and with the British Agents, Eastern Aden Protectorate and Western Aden Protectorate, the Chief Secretary, and the Political Officer and Commandant, Government Guards, as members. By this means, and otherwise by constant consultation with him, I secure the invaluable advice of the Sultan of Lahej whose position as *primus inter pares* among the Western Protectorate Chiefs is preserved without the embarrassment to him of his more striking advertisement as such while in the position of host and president of a congress at Lahej. I am in short satisfied that the Chiefs are not yet sufficiently advanced in responsibility to be brought together regularly in an informal manner to discuss a definite agenda. The wishes of the Chiefs are adequately ventilated at present through the political staff (substantially increased since Sir Stewart Symes' day) and the Sultan of Lahej; and I should prefer to postpone any attempt to bring the Chiefs together in regular and formal council until the present political organisation has further developed and its benefits have ripened, or until there are clear signs of a wish by the Chiefs themselves for mutual consultation in congress.

4. To turn now from the contents of the Memorandum to its purpose, I have serious doubts of the wisdom of attempting to crystallise in any formal manner our aims and intentions in the Protectorate. The codification of rules and conduct in a process so gradual and tentative as our development of security, prosperity and decency in the Protectorate will, I think, introduce an element of rigidity where elasticity is essential. Your Lordship will observe for instance that the Memorandum, although apparently less than two years old, is already out of date in material respects. I should greatly prefer to rely on the continually growing and developing body of informed opinion and practice of those entrusted with the conduct of affairs in the Protectorate, based on the principles which have come to be recognised as the foundation of our policy there, namely maintenance of our treaty obligations, and the furtherance and development of local Arab autonomy. As examples of statements of such opinions or descriptions of such practice I refer Your Lordship to Sir Stewart Symes' despatch, Secret, No. 14, of 30th January, 1929*, and to Sir Bernard Reilly's confidential despatch (2) of the 14th of February, 1940†. I suggest that documents such as these, together with the concurrence of His Majesty's Government in their terms, combine to form a more valuable guide to policy than a static memorandum of the kind under consideration.

I have, etc.,

J. HALTHORN HALL,

Governor.

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* No. 346 in Middle East, No. 22. † No. 78481/40 [No. 1].

Working Copy.

78575/41 PROOF.

This Copy having been revised may possibly carry a few corrections marked in ink. In order that these may be attended to it is of importance that THIS PARTICULAR COPY SHOULD BE RETURNED when sending to press.

78575/41 [N°4]

Confident

My Lord Aden, 12th September, 1941.

Wi report by Mr. W. H. Ingrams, C.M.G., ch he has prepared on policy in South We report referred to above. In the follow ne of the views expressed and suggestion

2. In iding purpose and principle of our policy mount of British influence and prestige c benefit as they see it. This is incontesta h perhaps inapplicable to the Yemen, a to my mind so important as necessarily mote the general welfare of the inhabitants r treaty obligation but it is an inescapable moral obligation, and unless it is faithfully discharged our policy will be barren and selfish, and, in the long run, ineffectual. If we cannot bring better conditions of living to the people of the Protectorate then I consider that much of our expenditure on the Middle East Vote is purposeless for the territorial integrity of the Protectorate, and the safety of Aden could no doubt be reasonably well secured by cheaper means. But I am confident that we can.

3. Mr. Ingrams feels that the suspicion with which Political Officers and indeed the Aden Government have hitherto viewed the Imam is largely unjustified. That suspicion, however, has been engendered by experience of the actions of Yemeni frontier officials, which not unnaturally were assumed to have been undertaken with the knowledge and approval of the Imam. Even in my short experience there have been glaring instances of bad faith on the part of Yemeni officials which would fully justify such suspicion. Mr. Ingrams has explained elsewhere that these dubious activities by Yemeni officials are not prompted by the Imam, who is ignorant of much that happens on his frontiers. This statement must, I think, be accepted with reserve; but whether the changed conditions in East Africa have brought about a change of heart in the Imam or whether the Imam has been misjudged in the past, it is, I agree, clearly wise to act on the assumption that his professions of amity and desire to foster friendly relations on the frontier are genuine, and to show a spirit of cordial reciprocity. I hope that as a result of Mr. Ingrams' visit to Sana' and of instructions for a closer ~~collaboration~~ Collaboration between Yemeni and British officials, which have been issued by the Imam to his officials and by me to Political Officers, more cordial relations will be established.

4. Mr. Ingrams refers to the uneasiness felt in Aden over his prolonged stay in the Yemen. I confess that at one stage I shared his anxiety and this for two reasons. In the first place Mr. Ingrams was aware of my desire that his absence should not extend beyond four weeks as I was anxious that leave arrangements should not be upset, and when his stay in the Yemen was prolonged far beyond that period I became a little uneasy and my uneasiness was increased by the fact that the attitude of Yemeni frontier officials was becoming more inimical. My second ground for anxiety was the fact that telegrams sent to Mr. Ingrams seemingly evoked no response. I subsequently learnt that such was the warmth of Imam's hospitality that Mr. Ingrams felt that His Majesty would be affronted if his stay was curtailed, and that my telegram had been unconsciously delayed in transit owing to the breakdown of the Eastern Telegraph Company's submarine cable.

5. In paragraph 5 of his note Mr. Ingrams refers to the administration of Aden Colony. Here perhaps the principal difficulty is the absence of any appropriate machinery to keep the Government in close touch with the Arab and Indian population and with public opinion. My predecessor, who had many personal links with the people, established throughout his many years of service in Aden, and knew all men and was known, and loved, by all, naturally did not feel this lack as does a newcomer who has not the same multiplicity of contacts nor the same informal channels of information. Nevertheless Sir Bernard Reilly was persuaded of the need for creating a native administration, and recommended the appointment of a District Commissioner. It was a disappointment to me when the officer appointed proved to be a young archæologist with no administrative experience. Alternative arrangements are, however, in train with a view to the formation of a modest district administration for the Colony, and in the meantime steps have been taken to maintain closer contact with the Arab population of Shaikh Othman, a community which has been rather neglected in the past.

Although my predecessor did much to improve both the amenities and the administration of the Colony, a good deal still remains to be done, especially in regard to the development of the social services. Progress will necessarily be retarded by the war, but I am hopeful that, despite the many obstacles and impediments imposed by wartime conditions, not least of which is the difficulty of obtaining trained staff, steady progress will be maintained.

6. In the Protectorate Mr. Ingrams considers, stated briefly, that there has been too much political activity in Western Aden Protectorate and too little in Eastern Aden Protectorate. There is some foundation for this statement but it calls for further explanation. In Western Aden Protectorate the

* Enclosure in No. 78575/41 [No. 1]: not printed.

Aden.

Working Copy.

78575/41 PROOF.

THE GOVERNOR

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 23rd December, 1941.)

[*Answered by No.* .]

Confidential.

MY LORD, Governor's Office, Aden, 12th September, 1941.

With my secret despatch of 28th August, 1941*, I forwarded a report by Mr. W. H. Ingrams, C.M.G., on his recent visit to the Yemen. I now enclose a note which he has prepared on policy in South West Arabia. This note originally formed an appendix to the report referred to above. In the following paragraphs of this despatch I shall comment on some of the views expressed and suggestions made in Mr. Ingrams' note.

2. In paragraph 2 of his note Mr. Ingrams suggests that the guiding purpose and principle of our policy in South West Arabia should be to secure the maximum amount of British influence and prestige compatible with the goodwill of the inhabitants and their benefit as they see it. This is incontestable. But I would add another purpose which, although perhaps inapplicable to the Yemen, applies both to the Colony and the Protectorate and is to my mind so important as necessarily to influence our whole policy. I refer to our duty to promote the general welfare of the inhabitants. Admittedly in the Protectorate this is not a formal or treaty obligation but it is an inescapable moral obligation, and unless it is faithfully discharged our policy will be barren and selfish, and, in the long run, ineffectual. If we cannot bring better conditions of living to the people of the Protectorate then I consider that much of our expenditure on the Middle East Vote is purposeless for the territorial integrity of the Protectorate, and the safety of Aden could no doubt be reasonably well secured by cheaper means. But I am confident that we can.

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deposition of the Fadhli Sultan, as Mr. Ingrams mentions, had a salutary effect and was welcomed by tribes and raya alike throughout Fahdli territory. Incidentally, Mr. Ingrams is, I think, wrong in saying that it caused uneasiness to the Sultan of Lahej; His Highness himself recommended the course adopted and quite recently urged me to deport the ex-Sultan who is, I fear, intriguing from Aden against his successor. But the action then taken undoubtedly caused a certain anxiety to other Treaty Chiefs whose consciences were uneasy, and was indeed so intended. In order that full advantage should be taken of the impression created by the deposition of Sultan Saleh, it was necessary to act quickly to settle both the Fadhli—Lower Yafa dispute about the Naza' water supply which was arresting the agricultural development of Ahyan, and the Fadhli—Audhali dispute about road tolls on the 'Irqub road which was impeding the marketing of vegetables from the Audhali plateau. As you are aware from my despatch No. 102 of 15th May, 1941, agreement on both these questions was duly reached. These agreements have already proved their value. But apart from these incidents Political Officers in an endeavour to promote security in the Protectorate have been actively engaged in negotiating truces or renewals of truces in Audhali, 'Illah, Beihan and Lower Aulaki, and it is, I think, primarily to these negotiations and to the methods employed that the Chief Secretary refers in the accompanying note as undue political activity. These truces were all good in themselves as extending security and preventing tribal wars and feuds. In certain cases their negotiation was undertaken at the request or in accordance with the known wishes of the contestants themselves who had become weary of these futile fends. Moreover, they were a necessary preliminary to the negotiation or attempted negotiation of comprehensive settlements of the matters in dispute. These settlements in most cases were entrusted to the Sultan of Lahej whose prestige and knowledge of tribal custom made him generally acceptable as an arbitrator.

7. But from conversations with His Highness and from other sources I have received confirmation of Mr. Ingrams' opinion that the number of truces under negotiation at one time, coupled with the fact that, in their zeal to improve security in their " districts " and to get quick results, Political Officers have been perhaps a little apt to act independently of the authority of the Treaty Chiefs concerned, has given the impression of unusual political activity and has aroused especially among the ruling classes some uneasiness as to Government's motives. In the circumstances I have thought it wise to issue fresh instructions to Political Officers, a copy of which I enclose.

8. I regret the necessity for this, because I am most anxious to give as much latitude as possible to Political Officers in the discharge of their duties so as to encourage initiative and the assumption of responsibility and to avoid the demoralizing effect of too great a degree of centralization. Moreover, I feel very strongly that there can be no real amelioration of the conditions of living in the Protectorate unless greater security of life and property can be established. The people of the Protectorate are unlikely to apply themselves to better methods of agriculture or to extend their cultivation while they are constantly liable to sudden death when working in their fields. Nor are they likely to sustain an interest in education or public health when they can only leave their houses at night or by crawling along trenches, as was the ignominious position until recently of the Lower Aulaki Sultan who was at feud with his cousins. Nor is trade likely to flourish when, as was the case in Beihan, the market place was the scene of constant fighting between the supporters of rival Shaikhs none of whom recognised the authority of the Treaty Chief. I feel strongly that if we are to discharge our moral obligation of promoting the welfare of the people of the Western Aden Protectorate, which will in itself contribute to the better security, we must, even at the risk of occasionally arousing a passing suspicion, press steadily forward with the establishment of peace and security by concluding wherever possible long or medium term truces settling inter-tribal disputes. I do not share the view of those who think that were it not for our pledges we should be well-advised to hand over the more backward parts of the Protectorate to Imam. I do not minimise the difficulties of a more progressive policy, but I have no doubt that elsewhere even wilder and more intractable people than these have been brought to appreciate the blessings of peace and the benefits offered by British civilization, and I am confident that in course of time, and in spite of disappointments and setbacks, an equal measure of success will be achieved in the Western Aden Protectorate.

9. It is, I think, largely a question of pace and method. Recently the pace has possibly been a bit too hot and the methods rather too robust, and I am content to adopt a slower pace and a less direct approach, and the more so because at present there are insufficient aircraft available to maintain proper inter-communication within the Protectorate and to provide the necessary reminder of that ultimate sanction upon which our authority rests. It is inevitable that in pursuing a policy of greater security and general betterment in the Protectorate we shall on occasion come up against the interests of this or that treaty chief or tribal Shaikh, a few of whom are, I fear, almost wholly evil. But with tact and patience any serious conflict of interests can usually be avoided and most of our objects can be achieved by remaining in the background and maintaining a steady and friendly pressure as and when opportunity offers.

10. I fully agree with the Chief Secretary that there can be no question of attempting to introduce any system of direct British Administration in the Western Aden Protectorate. I do not agree with him, however, in thinking that our assistance in the development of police, agricultural, medical and educational services should in all cases be limited to 50 per cent. of the cost. There are very few areas in Western Aden Protectorate where the local " Government " could at present or in the measurable future meet half the cost of the social services of which it stands in need.

11. In the Eastern Aden Protectorate I trace the decline of public security in tribal areas to three main factors:—

(1) The entry of Italy into the war which necessitated the concentration of local air resources on the defence of Aden and the prosecution of the war in East Africa and involved the substantial withdrawal of air control from Eastern Aden Protectorate.

(2) Failure to translate the comprehensive truces negotiated by Mr. Ingrams into lasting settlements of inter-tribal disputes.

(3) The subversive influence of Bin Abdat, whose submission after long and costly bombing operations coincided with Italy's entry into war, of which he took advantage to break his bond and to remain entrenched in his stronghold of Al Gharfa. All these factors reacted on each other. The partial withdrawal of air support, which the people of the Protectorate soon realized, led to a circumscription of British political activity in tribal areas because political officers felt that in their dealings with tribesmen they were denied the ultimate argument of force. Similarly Bin Abdat, who, even if mentally unbalanced, is undeniably astute, was quick to avail himself of our pre-occupations elsewhere to fabricate excuses for breaking his bond and was later emboldened by our seeming inactivity to resume his intrigues and his stimulation of tribal unrest and disorder.

Only with the collapse of Italian resistance in East Africa has it become possible to contemplate air operations on a serious scale against disturbers of the peace in the Hadhramaut and in the intervening period much valuable ground has been lost. Even now until unserviceable aircraft have been replaced extensive air operations cannot be undertaken. But this is the less unfortunate since, as Mr. Ingrams points out, punitive action against Bin Abdat must be preceded by lengthy political activity designed to isolate him as much as possible. Mr. Ingrams himself demonstrated that the people of the Hadhramaut as a whole wished for peace and security and welcomed them when they had them. But although these benefits were conferred they were never firmly consolidated, and the old habits of tribal feud and foray were deeply ingrained so that very little was needed to cause the new order to revert to the old disorder. I do not think that we should be unduly discouraged by this setback, some of the reasons for which I have suggested above. I feel confident that if the war remains remote from Southern Arabia and adequate air support is available, a sustained and well-directed political effort will recover the lost ground and will restore once again that security which is so necessary to the future development of the Hadhramaut.

11. Finally I do not share the view expressed by Mr. Ingrams in the concluding sentences of his note that it will not be possible to find British Officers suitable and content to work in the Eastern Aden Protectorate. He is, I think, unduly influenced by the abnormal conditions of wartime, and is too prone to attribute to a dislike of isolation and discomfort the present dissatisfaction of the political staff in Eastern Aden Protectorate, of which, I am sure, the truer explanation is to be found in the unrest engendered by the war and understandable disappointment at not being permitted to fight for their country. I feel no doubt that when peace is restored we shall have no difficulty in finding in our service men of zeal and ability fully capable of discharging the difficult and responsible tasks which await them in the Hadhramaut.

I have, etc.,

J. HATHORN HALL, Governor.

Enclosure in No.

REFLECTIONS ON POLICY IN SOUTH WEST ARABIA.

The process of drafting an account of my visit to the Yemen has led me to reflect on our relations with South West Arabia as a whole. I have a feeling that we have no very clear idea of what the purpose behind our activities is and that to this is partly due the rather lost feeling which some of the political staff suffer from and the fact that in a vague way we are " missing the 'bus." I am not entirely sure how this is happening and unfortunately I am not now as in touch with places and people as I used to be, but I will try to set down what I think regarding the common aim of our work in the whole of South West Arabia, for it seems to me that though each part of it has a different status from the other and though they vary so much in themselves there must be a common factor in our dealings with all of them.

As I see it the common principle and purpose throughout South West Arabia is for us to secure the maximum amount of British influence and prestige in the area compatible with the goodwill of the inhabitants and their benefit as they see it. South West Arabia consists from our point of view of four distinct areas—the Kingdom of the Yemen, the Colony of Aden, the Western Aden Protectorate and the Eastern Aden Protectorate (the more I see of the latter two the more distinct they appear to be), but I think that one common principle and purpose is common to all of them. After that we plainly have different objects in each of them, but in the main those objects must be governed by that principle.

In regard to the Yemen we have two direct objects, firstly to thwart any foreign power attempting to get as much or more influence than we have. In this, of course, I include reducing still further Italian influence if it is to be regarded as otherwise than negligible at present, and I do not overlook that though it is negligible at this moment it can potentially increase if our enemies are more successful in this area than they are at present. Secondly we have to preserve our protectorate. When I was in the Yemen I made amongst others two statements that always met with approval. I said that the defeat of the Italians was a victory for the Yemen because it meant that not only was the Yemen safe from their intended aggression but also that we no longer had to bother about their machinations and could therefore feel less watchful of the Yemeni Government, wondering if they were going to be seduced by them! Secondly, I said that while we should always be very firm about our boundaries they need never fear that we had any territorial ambitions beyond what we regarded as those boundaries and that beyond them we were only interested in the integrity and independence of the kingdom. In regard to boundary relations we have started semi-official discussions on arrangements which will I feel sure result in better feeling. In this connection I said to the Imam and Raghib that if we would only both realise that we had a single purpose, namely the keeping of the peace by and amongst the tribes on the frontier we could co-operate much more wholeheartedly. That it was not our purpose to claim bits over the *status quo* line that were not ours and it should not be theirs. Raghib remarked and the Imam agreed that this was perfectly true, that he was glad

to hear it said and that it was the first time he had heard it said. Where I feel we have missed the bus rather with the Yemen is by being too suspicious. I confess I have shared the suspicion, and I have noticed more since I came back the way that political officers attribute bad motives to the Imam, which I am quite sure are not there. I noticed also on the Dar al Beidha file that while I was being treated with every sort of consideration in Sana and meeting with what appeared to me to be a real desire to co-operate, that in Aden it was thought I was practically a prisoner, and that the Imam was prevaricating at every turn. I learnt yesterday that the Europeans in Aden thought I was a prisoner in the house in Sana and that the Government had had to mention bombing before I was allowed to return. All this was, I was told, most hush hush!

Any Arab may let you down and the Imam no less than the others, but while being vigilant one must trust. You cannot co-operate at all without trusting those you are trying to co-operate with. *This is important because we can only achieve anything permanent outside the colony by co-operation.*

The next division is the Colony. There, of course, one may say we can do as we like, but even in that case I assert that while our influence and prestige are unquestioned we must pay even more regard to goodwill than one need pay in non-Arab areas both because of the Arab character (of which I want to write a word later on) and because of the Yemen and the Protectorate. I have always held that the kind of rôle Aden has to play in relation to the Yemen and the Protectorate is educational by example. The idea I have tried to explain in my despatch on town planning. Aden Colony, although so small, is extremely difficult to run and one of the greatest difficulties at the present time is to balance the requirements of restrictions on trade and in the interests of security against the loss of goodwill.

In the Protectorate we have obligations to preserve the autonomy of the chiefs, not to interfere in internal affairs, and at the same time the objects of keeping the peace as far as possible, preserving the security of the trade routes and encouraging some progress in agriculture and social services. In the Western Protectorate we really have no rights to interfere at all beyond the letter of the treaties and what we do beyond that is done on sufferance. In the Eastern Protectorate we have apart and separate from the purely political rôle an advisory rôle which must not run counter to the general obligations above and which can only be exercised in the interests of the states. In the Western Protectorate interference is generally speaking not relished by the influential classes, in the Eastern Protectorate it is asked for by most of the influential classes, providing they are not interfered with. I have tried to put this briefly but one really cannot state the true position briefly as almost any statement has its saving clauses and the saving clauses have others!

I think we are imperilling goodwill in East and West of the Protectorate. It is not an easy problem. We could keep the Protectorate quiet and secure if we had plenty of aircraft, plenty of political staff and much better and more security forces. I think we should gain in the start of a long run a lot of ill-will and that then we should again be unpopular. The Arab does not want to be run. When the Italians came in not an aircraft could go to the Protectorate and in the Western Protectorate we weighed off with political action, helping where we could and encouraging the keeping of peace but not doing a political drive. The place kept quiet enough till the Quteibis murdered an airman, and we had to take action. Apart from that it kept on keeping quiet. We dealt with the Fadhli Sultan, and that had a very good effect, except that removing him did cause some suspicion from other chiefs, including His Highness. Since then we have started being politically very active, and I know there is a good deal of uneasiness and goodwill going away from us. I feel we are being politically too active and that even if we had the force to back the political action it would not pay us. I feel our political officers are becoming too like administrative officers. They are doing it very well but I think they are overdoing it. I think the traditions of the Western Aden Protectorate require a much more gradual approach and that generally not only will goodwill suffer still further but that security—the kind of security which allows trade to pass and suitably escorted travellers to pass which is about all we can expect for a long time—will diminish. I feel the political officers must be more political in the old sense of achieving what they can by merely persuasion and personality rather than by interference where they have not got public opinion right behind them and are relying on getting the government to use force.

In the Eastern Aden Protectorate the increasing loss of security and goodwill is due to opposite causes. There interference will largely be backed by public opinion and political persuasion and personality can do a lot to achieve more security than it can in the West. The country has not got the same traditions as the Western Aden Protectorate—they have not had non-interference promised and preached to them for 100 years. Notwithstanding this even if force is introduced (and air force can be introduced with the backing of influential public opinion) the vital need is for more political action of the right sort, i.e., whereas in the Western Aden Protectorate opposition to undue political interference springs from bedouin treaty chiefs' dislike of being stopped doing what they want to do, in the Eastern Aden Protectorate the opposition is much more subtle. You can disregard to a large extent the dislike of the bedouin chief for interference because he is not a treaty chief, and in principle you are doing only what the treaty chief has been doing for years before you came. You are more efficient of course than the Qu'aiti was with his Yafa'is against the Hamumis and others, but as long as you do not do more than keep him quiet he will not mind very much. But you cannot disregard the opposition of the class of people who want you to interfere. That is, you must not overdo it by making the Sultans too much like lackeys and still more you must not upset the Seiyids and townsmen—the people who on Nationalist grounds do not want to be ruled by the British—or who on religious grounds, the hidden Ulema, do not want the infidel becoming too powerful in a very holy land. I have not mentioned also the slaves, the Yafa'is and other factors whose feelings have to be considered. In fact if you appear to be upsetting the balance of power too much or getting too powerful yourself you are bound to be unpopular. So while much more political interference is required, it has got to be not only vigorous but cautious. One of the reasons why I always thought Arab dress necessary in the Eastern Aden Protectorate, but not in the Western Aden Protectorate, was the symbolism that the Advisers were not British Government Political Officers as they are in the Western Aden Protectorate but advisers belonging to the local show. Inside and of the show and not an outside influence. It is in that spirit I think that the political action has to be pursued there. It will be useless bombing Bin 'Abdat again without the most careful and prolonged political

action designed to get him as near isolated as possible. It is now not only Bin 'Abdat and the Hamumis who have to be pacified but all the country and most of the political action must take place before and not after he is dealt with. I am bound to say that while the administrative work of the Qu'aiti State particularly has made excellent progress lately, the political work of the country has badly fallen off.

It seems to me to come back to this that however different those four areas of South West Arabia are and whatever our various objects are in each of them, we shall not progress or secure co-operation unless we seek goodwill and ~~and~~ have public opinion behind us. The less goodwill we have the more British influence and prestige in the area will suffer and the more difficult our task will be. To a certain extent what is good for other people is also good for Arabs, but Arabs are above all other races individualistic to the highest degree. They have a common desire not to be interfered with, and this is sometimes called pan-Arabism or Nationalism or religious or something of the sort, but it is really that each one of them wants to do as he likes and the more backward he is the more pronounced it is. The more you make it possible for him to do as he likes (which is not the same as saying the more you leave him alone, but is much more difficult) the more goodwill you get from him. The more you interfere with him the more he will try to get rid of you. The only possible thing to do is to try and make it possible for as many as possible to do as much of what they like as is possible! And the more we succeed in doing that the more South West Arabia will be pleased and the better shall we appear in the eyes of the rest of the Arab world. That is why I say " the only possible thing." It might be practicable to rule the Protectorate, but quite apart from breaches of faith and what not it would be a most unwise thing to do and serve us imperially no useful purpose at all. I think we have to approach the task in these deserts in quite a different way to what we do elsewhere mainly for the Arab reasons given but also because there is no useful purpose to be served either political or economical for doing otherwise—and there is not the money to do it.

To sum up, I think that we should proceed as follows, and in saying so I do not mean that in many respects the following are not our present intentions and of course particularly as regards the Colony, I am only dealing with the Arab angle:

Yemen. Show trust and seek co-operation in frontier matters. Show no interest in Yemeni internal affairs, be ready to help when asked (*e.g.*, British Council and so on), but offer nothing except on obvious occasions, such as earthquakes. Keep up and encourage regular visits at as frequent intervals as possible between Yemeni authorities and ourselves. There should be as little business discussed as possible on such visits. The less business there is the more shall we be welcome.

Colony. As far as administrative and sanitary considerations require and security considerations permit seek to be " easy." Do all possible to make the place good to live in from an Arab point of view. Cheap food easy to get, water cheap and easy, transport the same and so on. Provide attractive educational and other facilities, of which the people will want to avail themselves, gradually build Aden up as an example which the rest of South West Arabia will want to copy and as a magnet which will attract the best of it to it.

Improve contact with the masses and find out thoroughly what they do want and base your schemes on that and not wholly on what we think is good for them.

The Protectorate. I think it is necessary to give first some picture of what I think can be ultimately achieved because I realise the difficulty of what I consider the only method of approach unless the whole policy is radically altered and His Majesty's Government is prepared to put down very large sums of money and really interfere in the autonomy of the chiefs. This I feel quite sure they are rightly not prepared to do.

Except in Lahej (and possibly in Dhala, though I am not at all sure of this) I think the most you can expect to achieve in the Western Aden Protectorate is a state of affairs in which there is less possibility of sudden death than at present. In time, a very long time, there may be no rifles and ammunition left and then life should be pretty secure. For the rest I think we can reasonably work and hope for some extension of agriculture, simple educational facilities for those who want them and likewise simple medical facilities. I do not see the population desiring more or being able to obtain it because of the essential poverty of the country and the character of the people. I do not see much in the way of organised governments: Patriarchal rule is the most that can be hoped for, and I doubt this being achieved effectively. There is really a good deal of sense in the school of thought which says hand the woollier part of the Protectorate over to the Imam, though I do not advocate it as I hate breaches of faith.

In the Eastern Aden Protectorate we have a chance of establishing two governments and should aim at a state of affairs in which all tribal units and other autonomous units run their own affairs in general accord with the State Governments, and in fact if not in name as the servants of those governments, but they will never be able to be completely controlled by the two governments. There are too many of them—nearly 2,000—and again there is not the money or power to subdue them with local resources. Agriculture, education, etc., on the basis of the Western Aden Protectorate, but more difficult. There is probably less fertile land available and the distances between cases are enormous comparatively. Incidentally there is a large tract of the Eastern Aden Protectorate of which we know comparatively nothing and in which we have as yet no contact beyond the fringes—the Mahara country.

I think the right method of procedure is

W.A.P. Go dead slow with political action which should be passive not active. Have Political Officers out and increase contacts but let them rather collect information and know people (very much as we should do in the Yemen) and not interfere unless our own major interests are involved. I think they should encourage the making of truces by the responsible people when they are asked to and not make the truces themselves. The Political Officers are agents of the British Government not rulers of the country, and the more they take direct action the more His Majesty's Government is involved. Above all give no ground for the chiefs to feel you are taking away from their sovereign rights or are likely to do so.

Actively increase police, educational, medical and agricultural assistance as near as possible on a fifty-fifty basis. At any rate our assistance should not be more than 50 per cent. This assistance to be regarded as a substitute for the old system of arms, ammunition and money presents which should never be given. As it is the present of His Majesty's Government for the general benefit you have a right to see that it is not usurped by the chiefs.

E.A.P.—Continue vigorously with government building insisting on co-operation. Do not do what you cannot get a reasonable measure of co-operation for, even if it is only passive. But be sure that government activities are Arab and not going to develop into concerns run entirely by yourself. Insist on responsibility.

As regards the tribes, vigorous political activity by Advisers (with such Arab assistance as can be got) as associates or agents of the local government. It has always been insisted when truces were made by Advisers in the Eastern Aden Protectorate that Government was no more responsible for them than in the Western Aden Protectorate, and I think that principle must be maintained. At the same time I am now rather inclined to think that it would be a mistake to put a number of European Advisers into the Eastern Aden Protectorate. I used to be very keen on getting more temporarily, though I have always said that the ideal to aim at was the Malayan one of having only the Adviser and no one else. But it does not seem to me possible to get a number of men who are content to immure themselves in the Hadhramaut and work as part of the local machine, and if you do not do that I think you will lose goodwill. Do not forget that on the whole the Eastern Aden Protectorate pays for what it does. In the Western Aden Protectorate it is much more His Majesty's Government who pays.

(Signed) W. H. INGRAMS.

Aden, 24th July, 1941.

GOVERNMENT OF ADEN.

No. C/3392.

Subject:—Protectorate Policy. 5th August, 1942.

I am directed to refer to minute 1 of the Protectorate Affairs Council meeting held on the 28th July, and to request that you will send copies to all Political Officers for their information and guidance.

2. Political Officers will understand that though these principles are of general application, there will from time to time arise cases in which it is necessary for them to use their own judgment as to how far they can and should interfere, and they may be sure of the support of Government where ever possible.

(Signed) J. LESLIE,
for Chief Secretary to the Government.

The Political Officer i/c W.A.P.
Crater.

Copy to:—The Resident Adviser, Mukalla.

EXTRACT FROM

MINUTES of a meeting of the PROTECTORATE AFFAIRS COUNCIL held at the Secretariat on 28th July, 1941.

1. *Protectorate Policy.*

Those sections of the Colonial Office Memorandum on Protectorate Policy were discussed which dealt with the duties of Political Officers and the extent to which they should intervene with the object of establishing security in the Protectorate and improving the standard of government and the conditions of the governed. The Chief Secretary expressed the view that there had been too much political activity recently and a tendency to interfere unduly with treaty and lesser chiefs. He had been informed by several sources that this unusual activity had created a certain amount of uneasiness and resentment in the Western Aden Protectorate. The Chief Secretary thought that Political Officers when visiting the Protectorate should not show any eagerness to intervene in disputes nor to enquire into grievances, but should listen to any complaints or other representations made to them. In short (while keeping themselves fully informed as to all events in the area) they should not look for trouble but wait until trouble came to them. If they were too active, they would excite the suspicion and hostility of the Treaty Chiefs and possibly also of the tribes who resented interference and were intensely individualistic. Mr. Figgis was inclined to agree that there had recently been too much activity and that a more passive policy should be adopted.

His Excellency said that it was largely a matter of method and tempo. If Political Officers acted independently of Treaty Chiefs, or appeared to be doing so, they would soon alienate the Chiefs and would then be incapable of achieving anything without resort to force. Force, which in practice meant bombing, should only be used very rarely and then only to achieve some really important object. One Treaty Chief had been removed with salutary results, but His Excellency had no intention of removing any others. Consequently Political Officers should endeavour to win the friendship and confidence of the Treaty Chiefs whose countries they were touring and should in every case endeavour to work thro' those Chiefs. In the case of unimportant tribal feuds for example the Political Officer should encourage the Chief to negotiate a truce, while keeping in the background himself so that the kudos or odium of the settlement should rest on the Chief. If the Political Officer came across some outstanding example of misrule he should mention it to the Chief as something that had come to his knowledge which he was sure the Chief would wish to know about and would wish to remedy. He should not press the suggestion to the point of jeopardising his friendly relations with the Chief without explicit instructions from Government. The more he was successful in winning the friendship and confidence of the Chiefs the more likely were such suggestions as these to prove effective. A Political Officer should not tour in tribal areas without consulting the Treaty Chief and telling him where he proposed to go. He should in each case ask the Chief to let him have one of his wakils to accompany him.

Political Officers should not normally concern themselves with petty tribal disputes or feuds; rather they should concentrate on the settlement of one or two serious disputes affecting either the tranquility of the frontier or the security of an important area or trade route, and in so doing should aim at a long truce and a real settlement of the causes underlying the dispute. In each case before attempting a major settlement (with which the Treaty Chief should be closely associated) they should seek the concurrence of Government and in particular should ascertain what pressure could properly be brought to bear on any recalcitrant parties, and whether in the last resort Government would be prepared to use force. While Political Officers should generally endeavour to increase the prestige and authority of Treaty Chiefs, they should give them no support in event of tribal risings brought about by gross misgovernment or maltreatment.

For the present at all events political contact in Western Aden Protectorate should be restricted to Subeihi, Abdali, Haushabi, Amiri, Audhali, Lower Yafa'i, Fadhli and Beihan areas. Occasional visits should be paid to Lower Aulaqi, but Dathnia, Upper Aulaqi and the country to the East should be left severely alone.

Political Officers should visit frequently and show great interest in all schools and dispensaries in the Protectorate, and should press forward with the writing up of their " District Note Books."